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Abstract: 
‘Space does not exist fundamentally: it emerges from a more fundamental non-spatial structure.’
This intriguing claim appears in various research programs in contemporary physics. Philosophers
of physics tend to believe that this claim entails either that spacetime does not exist, or that it is
derivatively real. In this article, I introduce and defend a third metaphysical interpretation of the
claim:  reductionism  about  space.  I  argue  that,  as  a  result,  there  is  no  need  to  subscribe  to
fundamentality, layers of reality and emergence in order to analyse the constitution of space by
non-spatial  entities.  It  follows that  space constitution,  if  borne out,  does not  provide empirical
evidence in favour of a stratified, Aristotelian in spirit, metaphysics. The view will be described in
relation to two particular research programs in contemporary physics: wave function realism and
loop quantum gravity. 
Keywords: spacetime; space; emergence; fundamentality; levels of reality; quantum gravity; loop
quantum gravity; configuration space realism.
1. Recovering Space and Spacetime in Contemporary Physics
‘Space does not exist fundamentally: it emerges somehow from a more fundamental non-spatial
structure.’ This intriguing claim appears in various approaches to quantum mechanics and quantum
gravity. In quantum mechanics, proponents of  wave function realism (also called ‘wave function
monism’ or ‘configuration space realism’) argue that wave functions are genuine entities, physical
fields, living in a physical counterpart of the configuration space (that describes all the possible
state of the physical system under consideration), namely, in a structure made of 3N dimensions, N
corresponding to the number of physical particles. Therefore, in this account, the actual world is
made of a gigantic number of dimensions, and is inhabited by a physically real wave function, itself
understood as a collection of properties assigned to coordinates in a space very different from the
ordinary space. A problem is then to understand the metaphysical status of the ordinary space we
experience on a  daily  basis,  and its  relation with the physical  configuration space.  In quantum
gravity, research programs such as loop quantum gravity and string theory state that the relativistic
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spacetime is not fundamentally real and emerges from a non-spatio-temporal ontology.1 Here again,
one problem is  to understand the metaphysical  status  of the emerging structure (the relativistic
spacetime). The proposal that space or spacetime is not fundamentally real is far more radical that
the relationist claim–Leibnizian in spirit–that spatial or spatio-temporal relations depend on their
relata, space or spacetime being identified with the collection of these relations. What comes under
attack with the phenomenon of space emergence is not the substantiality of space (ordinary space or
relativistic spacetime), but the fundamental existence of its structure: if borne out, space emergence
would entail that space, with its structural organization–as described by general relativity with the
metric field, and our ordinary phenomenology–does not exist fundamentally (or alternatively, that
another space exists fundamentally, but one which differs both from our familiar phenomenological
space and from the spacetime of general relativity in the case of quantum gravity). 
If one of these approaches turns out to be right, then it seems that we will have a novel reason
to accept the existence of levels of reality connected by relations of ontological priority. Indeed, at
first glance, the claim that ordinary space (or relativistic spacetime) is not fundamental invites two
main readings: either space is not real at all or it is non-fundamentally real. In other words, the first
interpretation amounts to the view that space is emergent (or does not exist fundamentally) because
space does not exist simpliciter, suggesting that emergence should be explained away as a form of
illusion.2 This eliminativist view leads to the disturbing consequence that almost everything we take
to be true about space is literally false. According to the second approach, the derivative space view,
space is emergent because space does exist derivatively. It suggests a layered picture of the natural
world with at least two levels of reality, the space level being less fundamental than the non-spatial
fundamental structure, this more-fundamental-than relation being here identified with a relation of
ontological priority. Although eliminativism has been voiced in the philosophy of physics literature,
most philosophers of physics are attracted by this second interpretation and take the disappearance
of space or spacetime to engage the existence of at least two levels of reality: a more fundamental
non-spatio-temporal level and a less fundamental spatio-temporal level.
As a result, space emergence seems,  prima facie, to entail the existence of some levels of
reality.3 The idea that reality is layered in ontological levels is not new. Importantly, we find it in
1 Similar claims appear in most research programs in quantum gravity. For a general and more technical review
of the features usually ascribed to space and time and said to be missing, see Huggett and Wüthrich (2013)
and Le Bihan and Linnemann (forthcoming). For a discussion of the issue in string theory, cf. Huggett (2017).
For a defense of the view that quantum gravity does not necessarily entail that spacetime is not fundamental,
see Yates (2018).
2 Emergence would then be epistemic with no counterpart  existing in  the world.  Of course,  understanding
exactly how this is possible is part of the challenge the eliminativist has to meet.
3 Depending on what we mean by the expression ‘level  of reality’, one might argue that a world made of
fundamental and non-fundamental entities should not be understood as a world in which there are levels of
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discussions on the status of special  sciences. One possible interpretation of the non-reductionist
claim that special sciences such as biology or cognitive psychology do not reduce, semantically, to
fundamental physics is that the entities engaged by these special sciences may not be identified with
the entities posited by fundamental physics. If true, then the natural world is layered in several
levels of reality, one corresponding to each of the special sciences.4 As such, a proponent of levels
in special sciences might argue that space emergence would provide us with new evidence that the
natural world is layered. Could it be that even within physics we might find evidence of levels and
that anti-reductionism is the best approach to special sciences?
I will suggest otherwise and argue that space emergence does not require positing ontological
levels,  relations  of ontological  priority,  or emergence within physics. In order to argue for this
claim,  I  will  introduce  and motivate  the  mereological  bundle theory of  space5:  what  we call  a
‘derivative’ or a ‘non-fundamental’ space is in fact a mereological bundle of proper parts of the
‘maximal structure’, namely the whole cosmos, whatever its exact (non-spatial) nature turns out to
be. 
At this stage, a word of caution is in order. This essay aims at prompting a discussion between
metaphysicians  about  how we should  best  understand philosophically  what  has  been called  by
physicists working in quantum gravity ‘space emergence’. The topic is especially difficult since it
lies at the intersection of various fields: analytic metaphysics, philosophy of quantum gravity and, it
has  been suggested,  philosophy of  emergence.  Note,  however,  that  the  expression ‘emergence’
should be understood in this context as a neutral expression, a placeholder for a problem, which
does  not  commit  one  to  any  particular  interpretation  of  the  nature  of  the  relation.  This  point
deserves our attention since the term has a different meaning in philosophy and general philosophy
of  science on  the  one  hand,  and  in  philosophy  of  physics  and  physics on  the  other  hand–the
separation  may  be  drawn  differently,  but  what  matters  here  is  that  there  exist  two  different
terminological traditions. In the field of general philosophy, the relation of emergence is a very
specific notion associated with highly specific features: especially, emergent entities, properties or
powers are regarded as not owned by the system from which they emerge, against reductionism (the
view originates in the tradition of British emergentism6 and has been recently discussed by several
reality. It should be clear, however, that in the case of space emergence, non-fundamental spatial entities are
taken to be all located in the same domain of description, while fundamental entities all are located in another
domain of description, in such a way that if we want to claim that these  domains of description represent
genuine distinct ontological domains, the talk of levels of reality is perfectly justified.
4 The layered approach is famously criticised by John Heil (2003a, 2003b).
5 More precisely, I will defend that the mereological approach is a possible abstract characterization of space
emergence.  This  possibility  is  enough  to  show  that  space  emergence  does  not  entail  the  existence  of
ontological levels.
6 See McLaughlin (1992), Thomas (2013).
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philosophers, cf. Humphreys 2016 for a review). In contrast, in physics and philosophy of physics
proper, the relation is generally regarded as a generic one which still has to be interpreted further
and is even consistent with reductionism (see Butterfield 2011, Crowther 2018).
The fact that physicists and philosophers of physics have referred to the problem of spacetime
emergence by using the word ‘emergence’ is a bit unfortunate when one wishes to further analyse
the notion: indeed, it already suggests that the relation obtaining between the non-spatio-temporal
and the spatio-temporal is a relation of (philosophical) emergence, a claim that is not made by most
philosophers of quantum gravity. The two notions of emergence share a very different story. In
physics,  the expression signals an issue when in philosophy it  corresponds to a highly specific
notion, quite at odds with the reductionist motivations that we find in the philosophy of quantum
gravity community.7
As a solution, I propose to rename the problem as a  problem of spacetime constitution, in
reference  to  the  problem of  material  constitution in  the tradition  of  analytic  metaphysics.  This
problem begins by examining the relation obtaining between material objects such as statues and
the matter they are made of. In a nutshell, the two objects seems to be numerically identical because
they share the same volume of spacetime; but they seem different since they have different modal
properties: for instance, the statue may not survive a reshape, contrary to the lump of clay it is made
of, entailing that the statue and the lump of clay instantiate  different  modal properties.  In both
contexts (the problems of material constitution and spacetime constitution), we may then formulate
the view that  constitution  is emergence,  implying that  some genuinely  new properties  pop into
reality at the derivative level. Although, for the sake of brevity, I will not develop in detail the
comparison here, the moral to be drawn is that constitution may be regarded as a more neutral
relation and that, the use of the expression ‘space emergence’ by physicists does not entail that the
philosophical notion of emergence should play a role in this context.
In  the  next  section  of  the  paper,  I  will  introduce  briefly  two  potential  cases  of  space
constitution:  wave function realism and  loop quantum gravity. In sections three and four, I will
critically  discuss,  respectively,  the eliminativist  view and the derivative  space view in order to
motivate reductionism as a third promising alternative.  In sections five and six, I will introduce
mereology and logical  mereology,  arguing that  space  constitution  can  be  analysed  in  terms  of
logical composition, avoiding any reference to ontological levels.
2. Wave Function Realism and Loop Quantum Gravity
In this section, I illustrate the idea of space constitution by describing two particular cases, one
7 But see e.g. Ladyman and Ross (2007) for a non-reductionist and naturalist interpretation of science.
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which is a possible interpretation (or theory) of quantum mechanics, the other a research program in
quantum gravity:  loop quantum gravity.  But many other  examples  of space emergence  may be
found  in  the  quantum  gravity  literature,  and  the  general  ontological  interpretation  that  I  will
propose, by its abstract nature, should apply to many, if not all, of them.8 LQG is one program
among many in quantum gravity. These programs aim at finding an explanation of quantum gravity,
either by starting with a GR framework, then introducing quantum aspects in the account (as with
LQG), or in trying to unify general relativity with the standard model of particle physics by building
a new theory (as with string theory).9 None of these research programs are empirically confirmed,
though. However, we may hope that at least one of these research programs is on the right track and
it is interesting to look at the features shared by most of these approaches. Space constitution is one
such a shared feature. In brief, space emergence is not specific to LQG but to most of the research
programs in quantum gravity–in such a way that LQG is  representative of the kind of scientific
revolution that is to be expected from physics. So in what follows, LQG should be taken as a
particular  example  of  the  situation  we  encounter  in  quantum  gravity  with  respect  to  space
constitution.
According  to  the  Wave  Function  Realist  interpretation  of  quantum  mechanics  (WFR
hereafter), our ordinary 3D space is constituted by a more fundamental space of 3N dimensions, N
being  the  number  of  fundamental  physical  particles10 in  the  universe,  or  more  accurately,  the
number  of  apparent fundamental  physical  particles:  properly  speaking,  fundamental  physical
particles  do not  exist  (see e.g.  Monton 2002,  2006,  Lewis  2004 and Ney 2012,  2015).  In  this
approach, the wave function is not (merely) a mathematical tool used to describe properties of a
particular physical system: the wave function is a genuine entity living in an exotic11 space (distinct
from  the  ordinary  space).  An  interesting  aspect  of  WFR  is  that  it  explains  non-local  Bell
correlations, the fact that some physical values of proper parts of dispersed physical systems are
anti-correlated.  In  WFR,  these  anti-correlations  are  explained  by  a  simple  fact:  two  apparent
8 In string theory, the situation is not clear yet. What seems clear, though, is that if relativistic spacetime is real,
it  is  numerically  distinct  from  the  space  in  which  the  strings  live  (see  Huggett  2017)  because  of  the
phenomenon of  duality  (see  e.g.  Le  Bihan  and Read (forthcoming)).  For  a  general  review of  spacetime
constitution  in  quantum  gravity,  see  Huggett  and  Wüthrich  (2013)  and  Le  Bihan  and  Linnemann
(forthcoming).
9 Right now, our two most fundamental  physical  theories  are  general  relativity  and the standard model of
particle  physics  (leaving  aside  the  possibility  that  macroscopic  thermodynamics  is  also  fundamental,  see
Ladyman  and  Ross,  2007).  The  two  theories  describe  different  physics  and  are  in  tension  to  explain
phenomena where gravitational effects (the playground of GR) meet quantum effects (an aspect of quantum
mechanics, also covered by the standard model of particle physics), namely phenomena such as black holes
and the very early universe.
10 ‘Fundamental particles’ refer here to ‘mereological simples’.
11 One may argue that the configuration space is not that exotic since physicists use them all the time. However,
what  is  exotic  is  the  physical  configuration  space understood  as  a  physical  structure  lying  behind  the
mathematical configuration space.
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numerically distinct entities  x and  y in 3D space share the same location in a higher-dimensional
space, as aspects of the wave function. Of course, the 3N-dimensional space (3N space from now
on) is just one possible ontological interpretation (or one possible theory) of quantum mechanics,
but other interpretations will not be discussed in this article.12
Take note that in WFR, the problem is only about space and not about time. 13 The wave
function lives in a 3N space where time flows or, in the framework of a B-theory of time,14 where
there is a further time dimension. This time dimension is regarded as being identical to macroscopic
time  (namely,  time  as  we ordinarily  conceive  of  it).  There,  the  problem is  to  understand how
fundamental space gives rise to a particular derivative space, being granted that fundamental time is
identical with derivative time–in such a way that it is more reasonable to just refer to time since the
fundamental/derivative distinction does not apply to time in this context. 
Let us now examine the ontological picture of loop quantum gravity in order to see how it
relates to the situation of WFR. According to Loop Quantum Gravity (LQG hereafter), spacetime is
not fundamentally  real:  what there is  instead are  entities described by “spin networks”, namely
collections of nodes and relations (the loops) between these nodes  (see Rovelli 2004 and Rovelli
and Vidotto 2014; for a summary aimed at philosophers cf. Huggett and Wüthrich 2013). When we
apply dynamics to 3D spin networks, we obtain a 4D system called ‘spin foam’. In LQG, the spin
foam is taken to be sufficiently similar to GR spacetime to explain the empirical success of general
relativity. These  spin  networks  represent  discretely  valued  volumes  and  areas,  generically  in
superpositions, prompting a question about the relation between these discrete quantum structures
and the continuous classical GR structure. Furthermore, the organization of the LQG structure does
not always correspond to the structure of the GR structure: some relations of adjacency in the LQG
structure correspond to relations of large distances in the GR structure (see Huggett and Wüthrich,
2013). In short, an approximation of GR spacetime emerges ‘somehow’ from a more fundamental
structure made of entities that are discrete and in a state of disordered locality.15
So let us assume that spin foam is the fundamental structure and GR spacetime is the relevant
12 Take note that wave function realism is an interpretation consistent with several other classical interpretations
of quantum mechanics, such as the Bohmian and the Many-Worlds interpretations.
13 Arguably, the discussion aims at explaining the connection between the 3N-world and ordinary space and
time.  However,  it  is  worth  asking  how it  could  be,  were  such  a  picture  to  be  true,  that  GR physics  is
predictively successful. So not only has the proponent of WFR to offer a story about the connection between
the fundamental 3N-world and phenomenal space and time, but also an explanation of the predictive success
of GR, which posits a four-dimensional structure.
14 See e.g. Oaklander (1987) and Mellor (1998).
15 A specific issue is the relation between the quantum LQG structure and the non-quantum GR structure. But
since the measurement problem is a specific issue, already to be found in quantum mechanics and quantum
field theory, it is not necessarily related to the problem of space constitution and I will leave it aside. It could
be that the measurement problem must play a role in solving the problem of spacetime constitution but I will
not purse this line of thought in this essay.
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derivative structure. We may distinguish between two conceptual issues with the disappearance of
spacetime in LQG: how are we to construe the emergence of something close enough to the world
described by general relativity in order to explain its predictive success (problem of GR success)?
And how are we going to make sense of the possibility of measurement somewhere and somewhen?
Can we appeal to measurements occurring in space and time to justify the claim that space and time
do not exist (problem of empirical (in)coherence)?16 The two problems of GR success and empirical
coherence rest on the very same issue: what is the metaphysical status of this constituted spacetime?
And why is it that this particular ordinary space exists rather than another space consistent with the
fundamental theory? As we shall see, in order to solve these issues, philosophers of physics usually
posit the existence of a derivative space, both in LQG and in WFR, thereby entailing the existence
of levels of reality within physics.
3. No Space?
According to eliminativism, space is not fundamentally real because it does not exist  tout court.
This is probably the more straightforward way to reject the idea that space constitution entails the
existence of levels  of reality.  ‘Constitution’  would be a misnomer or,  at  best,  constitution  in a
narrow epistemic sense: due to some features of our conceptual and perceptual apparatus, space
seems to exist. But there is no genuine, mind-independent, constitution of space since there is no
space.  In  this  interpretation,  the  phenomenology  of  space  and  time  relates  directly  to  the
fundamental  non-spatial  ontology,  without  positing  an  in-between  physical  derivative  spatial
structure. For instance, if we follow Albert (2015, 128-129), in the background of WFR, 3D objects
can be picked through functional realization.17 This functional role is merely a formal possibility to
build objects though, and there are no 3D objects obtaining in the world. Unlike the derivative space
view, eliminativism does not require postulating a stratified ontology with distinct levels of reality.
And it  does not require positing a special  relation connecting the entities inhabiting the distinct
levels.  So  eliminativism  is  less  demanding  than  the  derivative  space  view  and  avoids  any
commitment to levels of reality.
However,  this  interpretation  does  not  come  for  free.  In  the  metaphysical  and
phenomenological literature, it is quite common to defend the view that time does not flow, and that
the notion of flow corresponds to a perceptual artefact (see for instance Paul 2010 and Benovsky
2015). Most metaphysicians of time agree on the existence of  temporal relations. Following the
classical distinction between A-properties (the properties of being past, present, future, or being two
16 See Wüthrich (2017).
17 Lam and Wüthrich (forthcoming) have proposed to identify spacetime emergence with spacetime realization,
but their view is not tied to an eliminativist understanding and remains consistent with a derivative view.
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days past or future for instance) and B- or C-relations,18 the view is that temporal relations are
mind-independent components of the world. Eliminativism is far more radical since it  denies the
reality of spatial, temporal and spatio-temporal relations. Eliminativists have to deny that the very
basic features common to time  and space (like metrical and topological aspects) are real. So the
challenge the eliminativist  has to address is really radical.  It is far from obvious that it  will be
possible to come up with a consistent story about phenomenal time and space as perceptual artefacts
in a background ontology in which there are no spatial or temporal relations. Perhaps such a story
could be offered, but for now it is not clear what it would look like, and so, we should not take for
granted that there is room for such an explanation. As we shall see, the notion of derivative space
avoids many of these issues but generates new ones.
4. Derivative Space
According  to  the  derivative  space  view,  space  is  not  fundamentally  real  because  it  is  only
derivatively real (the view has been voiced for instance by Wüthrich, 2017, 298, cf. Le Bihan 2018
for further discussion). Space is grounded in, or is built from, a more fundamental ontology. There
are many possible ways to think of the connecting device obtaining between the two layers and
grounding or building the upper entities. One may construe the relation as a  grounding relation.
Note,  however,  that  this  relation  has  to  be  ontological–it  cannot  be  merely  a  mathematical
procedure (as with Albert's notion of functional realization that suggests an eliminativist picture).
The derivative view suggests not only that the world is stratified, but also that the layers are
related  by  a  connecting  relation and  that  the  derivative  structure  is  less  fundamental  than  the
fundamental structure. Take note that there is not necessarily a connection between the stratified
view and the existence of fundamentality relations. We may well discover one day that the world is
stratified although no relation of fundamentality is connecting the layers. Also, there is no logical
connection  between  the  existence  of  fundamentality  relations  and  the  view  that  this  or  that
particular  level  is  more fundamental  than the others.  Physics seems to construe the small-scale
world as being more fundamental than the macroscopic and the cosmological scales. Still, it might
be that the more fundamental level is the macroscopic level or the cosmological level (see Schaffer,
2010).
By  positing  a  derivative  space,  a  physical  creature  both  distinct  from  the  fundamental
18 B-relations are temporal relations of order (intrinsically orientated), C-relations are non-temporal relations of
order (not  intrinsically  orientated).  In  McTaggart’s  picture  (1908),  the flow of time (the transition of  A-
properties) in the C-dimension made of C-relations, generates an orientation of the dimension and results in
B-relations.  In  the  tradition  originating  in  Russell,  B-relations  are  primitive  notions  (the  relations  are
primitively orientated) and C-relations and A-properties are not real. See for instance Oaklander (1987) and
Le Bihan (2015).
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structure  and  the  phenomenal  space  and  time,  one  lays  the  groundwork  for  an  answer  to  the
phenomenal worry. If we perceive space and time, this is simply because space and time are real,
although derivatively real. We have direct phenomenal access to these derivative entities and this is
why our daily life takes place in a spatial  and temporal environment.  Also, the derivative view
explains the empirical success of GR: a derivative structure, close enough to GR spacetime, is a
physically real derivative entity. Finally, the derivative space view delivers, apparently, a solution
to the problem of empirical coherence. Christian Wüthrich describes this point as follows:
[It] is a necessary condition for an empirical science that we can at least in principle
measure or observe something at some location at some time. The italicized locution, in
turn,  seems to presuppose the existence of space and time.  If  that  existence is  now
denied in quantum theories of gravity, one might then fear that these theories bid adieu
to  empirical  science  altogether.  It  thus  becomes  paramount  for  advocates  of  these
theories to show that the latter only threaten the fundamentality, but not the existence of
space and time. (Wüthrich, 2017, 298)
In  distinguishing  between  the  fundamentality and  the  existence  of  spacetime,  Wüthrich
expresses the view that the two following claims are consistent: spacetime exists, and spacetime is
not  fundamental.  The natural  interpretation  of  this  conjunction  of  claims  is  that  spacetime  has
derivative existence, but lacks fundamental existence. Measurements and observations are occurring
in (derivative) space and time.
Of course, if we solve the problem of empirical coherence by stipulating the existence of a
derivative  space,  new issues  follow  from the  fact  that  the  natural  world  includes  two  related
structures: the fundamental structure and the derivative space. One may ask to which category the
connecting relation between the two structures is supposed to belong. A natural candidate, quite
popular these days, is the relation of grounding (see for instance Fine 2001, Schaffer 2003, Correia
and Schnieder 2012, and Wilson 2017). However, as others, I believe that the grounding relation
should be understood as an explanatory relation, not a mind-independent relation obtaining in the
world.19 Keeping in mind that the grounding relation will be understood here as an explanatory
relation,  let  me use instead the notion of  building relation,  understood as an ontological  mind-
independent relation existing between entities.20 What matters is that the building relation, whatever
19 See Miller and Norton (2017). If you disagree, taking the grounding relation as a mind-independent relation,
feel free to read ‘grounding relation’ where I write ‘building relation’; nothing substantial follows from this
terminological choice.
20 See Bennett (2017, section 2).
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it is, does not come for free in our ontology. If we do not need to posit a mind-independent relation,
we should try to describe the world without using it. Furthermore, the derivative space view implies
the  existence  of  levels  of  reality:  the  ontological  cost  gets  bigger  and  bigger.  The  notion  of
ontological level is not very clear, at least not as much as the notion of descriptive level. What does
it mean that behind levels of description (think for instance of the biological level or the chemical
level)  lie  ‘ontological  levels’?  One  could  argue  that  levels  come  for  free  and  should  not  be
interpreted too seriously. However, if ontological levels come for free, then these merely are levels
of  description:  the  notion  of  ontological  level  has  no  counterpart  obtaining  in  the  world.  The
derivative view thereby collapses into eliminativism.
But perhaps one may argue that this is not a genuine problem. After all, maybe the ontological
cost is well motivated insofar as it offers an adequate characterization of the delicate situation we
face in contemporary physics. Nonetheless, if it is possible to come up with a view that does not
entail the existence of levels of reality and has the same power of explanation, it should be preferred
over  the  derivative  space  view.  Or,  at  the  very  least,  if  you  do  not  believe  that  ontological
parsimony should be a too constraining criterion, the fact that space constitution is consistent with a
reductionist ontology shows that the puzzlement triggered by the problem of space constitution is
not in itself a reason favouring the existence of a derivative space, of layers of reality and of more-
fundamental-than relations obtaining between entities inhabiting these levels.
We  shall  now  turn  to  mereology  in  order  to  advance  such  an  interpretation  of  space
constitution, namely that space is a mereological sum of non-spatial entities. As we will see, the
mereological  view inherits  some advantages  of both eliminativism and the derivative view and
avoids any commitment to levels of reality and to ontological priority.
5. Mereology
According to the mereological view of space constitution, the so-called ‘derivative structure’ is in
fact a mereological sum of non-spatial building blocks. As such, space is not a genuinely derivative
structure.  Space  is,  in  some non-spatial  sense,  within the  fundamental  structure.  As  a  result,  I
suggest replacing the distinction between fundamental  and derivative structures by a distinction
between  maximal and  partial structures. Space is a partial structure, namely a proper part of the
maximal structure. And there is no genuine distinction between fundamental and derivative entities
(understanding  fundamentality  as  ontological  priority).  Indeed,  the  mereological  view
acknowledges the reality of space, but it is also consistent with a  reductionist ontology in which
there are no levels of reality.
In order to defend that space is composed of non-spatial building blocks, it is useful to make a
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distinction between two claims.  First,  mereology can apply to space: space can be consistently
approached  as  being  a  mereological  sum of  (at  least)  spatial  relations.  Indeed,  the  relationist
Leibnizian approach may be expressed as the view that space is identical with a mereological sum
of relations.  The substantivalist  view may be expressed as the view that space is identical to a
substance, or a collection of substances. Nonetheless, if space is identical to one substance, or a
collection of substances, it remains that the one substance is internally structured by spatial relations
(in the monist framework), or that the various substances (in the pluralist framework) are structured
by external spatial relations. Therefore, independently of whether space is only relational, or also
substantial, it has to be identical to a collection of spatial relations (in the relationist picture), or to a
collection of spatial relations and a ‘substantial something’ (in the substantivalist picture). What
matters here is that the mereological sum associated with space will have to include at least spatial
relations, independently of what the other ingredients will turn out to be: points, objects, properties,
or  substances  (cf.  Le  Bihan  2016).  Furthermore,  these  spatial  relations  may  well  instantiate
properties of various kinds–in order to account for the curvature of space, for instance. Therefore,
the view that space is identical to a collection of relations is consistent with the claim that space has
a rich and complex structure. If the reader believes that it is awkward to describe space as being a
mereological sum of spatial relations plus, possibly, other ingredients, what matters here is that the
view is consistent. At the very least, it is logically consistent to conceive of any piece of space as
being made of (i.e. composed of) spatial ingredients, and so, to conceive of the full physical space
as being a mereological sum of geometrical building blocks.
Second, spatial building blocks of space (spatial relations) themselves can be made of non-
spatial finer building blocks. Real difficulties start with this claim. If no spatial relations are to be
found among the mereological atoms21 of space, how are we going to construe the composition of
spatial relations from entities that are not spatial? Although classical mereology (cf. Simons 1987)
can easily apply to the composition of space, time or spacetime from spatial, temporal or spatio-
temporal relations, it might be in tension with the composition of space, time or spacetime from
entities that are not spatial, temporal or spatio-temporal. At least, classical mereology might have to
be philosophically interpreted in an original way in order to build an approach wherein space can be
construed as a mereological sum of non-spatial entities.
21 For the ease of presentation, I assume that the world has mereological atoms. However, the mereological view
is consistent with the claim that the world is gunky, i.e. that the world does not have mereological atoms. In
this view, decomposition obtains all the way down, infinitely, and any proper part of the world has proper
parts. For a discussion of the gunk view with respect to spacetime and the existence of objects, see e.g. Sider
(1993), Le Bihan (2013) and Benovsky (2016).
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6. The Mereological View of Space
Could  we  simply  assert  that  space  is  composed  of  non-spatial  building  blocks,  or  that  spatial
relations  are  collections  of  non-spatial  entities?  Denying  that  there  is  any  problem with  space
composition from non-spatial  building blocks would be one way to go, indeed. However, since
there is something odd in the transition from the non-spatial to the spatial, one might argue that
another explanatory move is required in order to make the claim plausible. For instance, if we focus
on disordered locality in LQG, how could it be that a particular geometrical organization is made of
a structure made of relations organized differently? In this section, I will assume for the sake of
argumentation  that  there  is  prima facie something  problematic  with  the  identification  of  space
constitution with space composition because of this strange explanatory gap between the sets of
primitives notions involved in the two theories and suggest a way to avoid the problem. But note
that  if  you  believe  that  there  is  no  genuine  explanatory  gap,  it  follows  immediately  that
reductionism is  a  third,  non-problematic  way to interpret  space constitution  (see Le Bihan and
Linnemann (forthcoming) for a study of the explanatory gap).
Logical mereology was developed as an approach of material objects (Paul 2002, 2006) in
order to solve philosophical puzzles that I cannot describe here, and extended to the composition of
space out of a physical configuration space in the context of quantum mechanics (2012). L.A. Paul
argues in favour of a bundle theory of material objects, the view that material objects are only made
of  properties  without  substrates to  instantiate  or  bear  these  properties.  The  properties  are  tied
together by a bundling relation. According to L.A. Paul’s mereological bundle theory, this bundling
relation is identical to the relation of mereological composition.22 Ordinary objects are regarded as
mereological sums of entities which do not belong themselves to the category of material objects
but to the category of properties. Properties are parts,  logical parts, of material objects. The term
‘logical’ should not confuse us, though. The relation of logical composition is  mind-independent
and concrete. It is mind-independent as it obtains independently of any observer and exists on its
own. It is concrete as it has the same existential status as physical entities. The word ‘logical’ is
here to express the idea that parts and wholes are not (only) carving reality at its geometrical joints,
but at its  categorical joints. An object is, allegedly, made of its spatial parts, but also, if we are
ready to buy into L.A. Paul’s notion of logical part, of its properties. Therefore, logical mereology
allows  trans-categorical composition, namely that entities belonging to a particular metaphysical
22 L.A. Paul conceives of the relation of composition as restricted (composition sometimes occurs, sometimes
not), but this is not an essential component of the mereological bundle theory in general. Although the view is
not  defended  in  the  literature,  to  my  knowledge,  one  might  endorse  the  view that  material  objects  are
generated by the unrestricted composition of  primitive ingredients,  entailing that any conceivable  sum of
properties actually is an object.
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category (say, properties) compose an entity that belongs to a distinct metaphysical category (say,
an object or an event).
I will now present the mereological bundle theory of space, which avoids positing levels of
reality. I will then describe more precisely how the view differs from L.A. Paul’s view. According
to  the  mereological  bundle  theory  of  space,  the  relation  of  constitution  is  identical  to  logical
composition, and each of the constituted entities is a mereological bundle of proper parts of the
maximal  structure.  In  this  framework,  3D  spatial  relations  (in  WFR)  and  4D  spatio-temporal
relations (in general relativity) are interpreted as being logically made of parts belonging to distinct
metaphysical  categories.  The  entity  we call  ‘space’  is  a  trans-categorical  mereological  sum of
mereological atoms (following a bottom-up description) or, equivalently, a trans-categorical proper
part of the maximal structure (following a top-down description). Importantly (in order to make
sense of geometrical deviation in LQG), trans-categorical proper parts of a spatial relation do not
have to be connected in the maximal structure. We can consider any distribution of entities, and ask
whether this distribution is a mereological sum. And regarding whether or not a distributional class
of entities composes a collective class, namely a mereological sum of these entities, the answer will
be given by the actual derivation of the spatial description from the non-spatial theory. Composition
occurs when, and only when, we may map an entity from the spatial structure onto a plurality of
entities that are parts of the non-spatial structure. As a result, the mereological bundle theory of
space  entails  a  restricted  composition  answer  to  van  Inwagen’s  special  composition  question
(1990), which might count as a good or bad point, depending on one’s philosophical view about the
range of composition.
Operating under these assumptions, we end up with two structures, namely two collections of
relations that permit us to localize entities. Some of the relations or other categories that compose
the maximal structure, also compose trans-categorical sums–and these trans-categorical sums are
spatial or spatio-temporal relations. Also, each connection between two constituted spatial or spatio-
temporal relation is a logical mereological sum made of ingredients that are parts of the maximal
structure.  Therefore,  trans-categorical  composition  plays  two  functions:  first,  composing  each
spatial or spatio-temporal relations; second, composing the whole spatial system of locality by also
composing the connections between these relations, namely the organization of spatial or spatio-
temporal relations.
Take the case of LQG and consider a fragment of GR spacetime: this fragment includes a
constituted system of locality with relations of partial order between events or points. According to
the mereological view, each of these relations of partial  order is a mereological sum of entities
localised,  and  potentially  dispersed,  in  the  maximal  structure.  But  really,  in  the  mereological
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framework, each of these relations of partial order is numerically identical to a mereological sum of
logical  proper  parts  of  the  maximal  structure.  These  ingredients  can  be  both scattered  in  the
maximal  structure by being non-local with respect to the system of locality associated with the
maximal structure and local in the constituted spacetime, namely the partial structure we refer to as
‘spacetime’.  Each  spatial  or  spatio-temporal  relation  that  constitutes  space  (and  looks  like  a
primitive entity) is in fact  made of trans-categorical parts. The mapping between the non-spatio-
temporal building blocks and the spatial or spatio-temporal entities may well be very complex and
strike us as weird, but there is no insurmountable difficulty here. Each relation that constitutes space
is itself made of trans-categorical parts, and the whole space structure results from a relation of
composition applied to each spatial relation.
Now, I will describe four ways in which my mereological approach differs from L.A. Paul’s:
a)  composite  entities  are  not  necessarily  objects;  b)  mereological  simples  are  not  necessarily
properties; c) property instantiation is not parthood; d) parts are not more fundamental than the
wholes that they compose.
a)  Composite  entities  are  not  necessarily  objects. L.A.  Paul  conceived  of  her  view  as
describing fusions of properties, which we identify with objects (both in the context of discussions
about the nature of ordinary objects, and of discussions about the constitution of 3D objects from a
3N space). Because of the focus on material objects (2002) and on WFR (2012), Paul focused on
the  composition  of  objects from mereological  atoms.  But  note  that  there  is  no  reason  why  a
composed entity must belong to the category of material objects. Although material objects might
well be bundles of mereological entities, in the context of the recovering of GR I propose to identify
the composite  entities  with spatio-temporal  relations.  Note  that  there  is  some flexibility  in  the
account  regarding how we should think  about  the category  of  spatial  entities.  The category  of
spatial entities may have different categorical structures depending on whether space is analysed as
a collection of relations only, or as a substance, for instance.
b) Mereological simples are not necessarily properties. In the same way a chair is regarded as
being made of various properties according to Paul (2002), space is here regarded as being made of
various ingredients: 3N relations, spin networks, or whatever else should be posited by physicists.
These ingredients are not in space, and they are not space itself. They are building blocks of space.
And maybe the building blocks belong to particular physical categories like spin networks, energy
or  3N relations.  Perhaps  we  should  categorize  them  as  general  metaphysical  categories like
properties or relations. Further work has to be done in order to determine to which categories the
non-spatio-temporal  mereological  building blocks belong,  and arguably,  the result  will  differ in
each particular approach to quantum gravity and WFR. But it should be noticed, in the case of
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quantum gravity, that the more the account is open to different categories at the mereologically
fundamental level, the more it remains open to the success of several research programs in quantum
gravity.23 
In  a  way,  and I  think  this  is  the  spirit  of  L.A.  Paul’s  account,  which  is  supposed to  be
empirically flexible, namely open to the insight that we will get from physics, the account remains
neutral  on the categorical  nature of the mereologically  fundamental  parts.  It  might  be polyadic
properties, but also points, relations which instantiates properties, substances or other categories.
Although  it  is  doubtful  that  physics  will  single  out  a  unique  set  of  categories  as  being
mereologically fundamental, at least, these categories will have to be deployed in order to be as
close as possible to the physical theory under consideration.24
c) I also reject the claim that  natural instantiation is parthood, namely that a natural object
instantiates a natural property iff this property is one of its proper parts. For instance, one possible
theory  of  instantiation  that  fits  nicely  with  the  account  is  that  properties  and  relations  are
instantiated by the sole fact of being connected to other actual entities (cf. Le Bihan 2016).
d) Finally, and most importantly, L.A. Paul endorses the ontological priority of the parts over
the whole.25 Therefore, L.A. Paul’s approach commits her to a stratified picture, giving ontological
priority to the mereologically fundamental level. But this claim is independent of the mereological
bundle theory of constituted entities (or material objects). One may accept the claim that constituted
entities are mereological bundles of entities composing the maximal structure, and refuse the further
claim that these parts are metaphysically prior to the wholes they logically compose. The view is
compatible with the claim that wholes are more fundamental than parts and, interestingly for our
purpose,  that  neither  parts  nor  wholes  are  more  fundamental  than  the  other  (in  the  sense  of
ontological  priority).  The mereological  bundle theory,  thereby,  does  not  entail  the  existence  of
levels of reality since parts are not more fundamental than the wholes they compose. As such, there
is no reason to believe that non-spatial parts belong to a more fundamental level, or that spatial
23 Also, it is very unlikely that the fundamental ontology will include ‘primitive location properties’ (properties
of being at a particular coordinate) as proposed by Paul (2002) in order to solve the problem of material
constitution. Indeed, if space is not a fundamental structure, it is hard to understand how location properties
might be primitive ingredients fusing with other properties in order to compose spacetime.
24 Importantly, in my picture quantum gravity has to describe the nature of mereologically fundamental entities,
when  analytic  metaphysics,  in  association  with  effective  theories  like  general  relativity  and  quantum
mechanics will have to account for the ontological categories involved in these structures. Here we must
distinguish WFR and LQG (as an example of  a  QG program).  If  we focus on the best  interpretation of
quantum mechanics only, then the issue is about how to recover the description of a 3D world from a 3N
world, and the mereological bundle theory of 3N relations will offer such a theory. Alternatively, if we focus
on the broader picture including quantum gravity, it may well be that we need a three levels description, with
the 3N world being made of components from the ontology described by quantum gravity, and the 3D world
being made of entities parts of the 3N structure.
25 See for instance Paul (2012, 221, footnote 1). Paul contrasts her view with the approach of Schaffer (2010)
who takes wholes to be metaphysically prior to their parts.
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wholes  (spatial  relations)  belong  to  a  more  derivative  level.  Therefore,  the  mereological  view
avoids positing levels and allows us to stick to the more traditional view that the world is made of
parts, the spatial and the non-spatial theories corresponding to particular ‘mereological levels’. 
The mereological theory of space thereby inherits the advantages of the derivative space view
since  it  accepts  the  reality  of  space:  there  is  no  phenomenological  issue  since  both  our
measurements and perceptions are occurring within time and space (or spacetime). The view avoids
positing genuine derivative entities and allows us to adopt an ontology that does not include levels
of reality. Another interesting advantage of the mereological view over the derivative space view is
that the relation of constitution is identified with a generic relation, namely one we find in many
places in our ordinary and scientific descriptions of the world: the relation of composition. There is
no need to posit a new and theoretically costly relation of emergence, designed specifically to do
the work we expect it to do. One may object that this is true of the standard relation of composition,
but not of the trans-categorical interpretation of composition. I agree: the latter might not be part of
our naïve ontology. But it does not mean that the relation of trans-categorical composition does not
explain a lot in many different contexts. I suggest that since the notion can do so much explanatory
work (both  in  contemporary  physics  and in  metaphysics,  as  established  by L.A.  Paul)  without
positing  levels,  it  is  an  interesting  option  to  take  it  as  a  primitive  theoretical  notion  in  our
ontological interpretation of LQG and WFR.
Perhaps the reader will object to this line of thought that trans-categorical composition is just
another  name  for  emergence  (in  the  philosopher’s  sense),  though:  with  the  substitution  of
metaphysical  emergence  by  trans-categorical  composition,  we  have  not  accomplished  much.
However, there is no ontological priority of the parts over the whole, or of the wholes over their
parts. The mereological approach states that the natural world is made of non-spatial parts, and that
these parts are not more fundamental than the spatial relations they compose. To put it differently,
we do not need to take seriously the claim that building blocks of space are literally building space.
Building blocks  are  as much the result  of a  trans-categorical  decomposition  from the maximal
structure,  since  there  is  no  privileged  ontological  direction added  to  composition  and
decomposition. This is a crucial difference with respect to emergence as usually construed. Indeed,
emergence is regarded as being asymmetric and generating ontological levels, in this context.
Finally, let me clarify briefly a methodological point. With composition we have a primitive
theoretical notion that does a lot of explanatory work. The relation has a cost because, after all, we
have to accept in the first  place the existence of this  relation if we want it  to do the job. But,
arguably, any metaphysical account of space constitution will have to rely on some primitive notion
that explains the shift from the non-spatial to the spatial (leaving aside eliminativism). To put it
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differently, what we need is an interesting primitive notion acting as problem-solver in the context
of space constitution (for an analysis of these two notions, see Benovsky 2010). The particular
problem-solver  that  I  have considered  (composition)  must  be weighted in  comparison with the
generic relation of constitution that we find in contemporary physics (‘emergence’) and with other
building relations that could be used to analyse the neutral relation of constitution. What matters
here is that composition is a particular building relation, a particular problem-solver, that clearly
avoids an ontologically loaded interpretation of the levels involved in space constitution, and avoids
positing a relation of ontological priority obtaining between the levels. To be crystal clear: it does
not show that space constitution should necessarily be interpreted in a mereological framework. But
the very existence of this levels-free problem-solver shows that space constitution does not entail
the existence of ontological levels connected by relations of ontological priority.
7. Conclusion
The mereological view of space offers an interesting middle way between eliminativism and the
derivative space view. Space is a mereological bundle of non-spatial building blocks. It is neither
derivatively  real  nor  fundamentally  real  since  there  are  no  levels  of  reality  and  no separation
between fundamental and derivative entities. The view inherits many advantages of the derivative
space view: it solves the problem of empirical coherence and the phenomenal issue by accepting the
reality of space. But it does so at a lesser cost by avoiding committing to a stratified ontology. Thus,
space constitution is not necessarily  pointing towards the existence of ontological  levels  within
physics,  and  we  should  not  be  too  quick  to  see  there  a  new  motivation  for  adopting  anti-
reductionism  about  special  sciences.  More  generally,  composition  is  an  excellent  primitive
theoretical notion to interpret space constitution, without positing unnecessary entities (levels and
non-fundamental  entities).  Therefore,  the  phenomenon  of  space  constitution,  if  it  had  to  be
confirmed in one of the research programs in quantum gravity or if WFR turned out to be the best
reading of quantum mechanics, would not commit us to a strong relation of emergence: with trans-
categorical mereology, we can get rid of emergence (in the philosopher’s sense), fundamentality as
ontological priority and levels of reality.26
26 I  wish  to  thank  Augustin  Baas,  Jiri  Benovsky,  Claudio  Calosi,  Lorenzo  Cocco,  Fabrice  Correia,  Karen
Crowther,  Michael  Esfeld,  Nick  Huggett,  Rasmus  Jaksland,  Niels  Linnemann,  Vincent  Lam,  Keizo
Matsubara, Sebastian Murgueitio Ramirez, Christian Wüthrich, David Yates, an anonymous referee and the
audiences at the workshop Metaphysics and Physics: Methodological Links (University of Lausanne) and at
the Third Annual Conference of the Society for the Metaphysics of Science (Fordham University) for valuable
feedback. This work was performed under a collaborative agreement between the University of Illinois at
Chicago and the University of Geneva and made possible by grant number 56314 from the John Templeton
Foundation. Its contents are solely the responsibility of the author and do not necessarily represent the official
views of the John Templeton Foundation.
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